Abstract This paper introduces a class of non-additive anonymous games where agents are assumed to be uncertain (in the sense of Knight) about opponents' strategies and about the initial distribution over players' characteristics in the game. We model uncertainty by non-additive measures or capacities and prove the Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence theorem for this class of games. Equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized under milder conditions than in the case of additive games. In particular, it is not required for the space characteristics to be atomless under capacities. The set-valued map of the Cournot-Nash equilibria is upper-semicontinuous as a function of initial beliefs of the players for non-additive anonymous games.
Introduction
Standard non-cooperative game theory assumes that players involved in a game behave strategically and rationally. They form beliefs about their opponents' actions and choose their best response given those beliefs. In most complex situations it is difficult (or even impossible) to guess the action of an opponent precisely, therefore beliefs are usually modelled in a probabilistic manner. That is, a player would construct a probability distribution which represents her beliefs about future actions of other players. This assumption however is not realistic and too restrictive in many circumstances. There is a growing body of literature which demonstrates that individuals do not form probabilistic beliefs in a wide range of real-world situations. A classical example is the Ellsberg's Paradox (Ellsberg 1961) which shows that individual's preferences cannot be supported by a probability measure as suggested by the subjective expected utility model (Savage 1954) .
One way to model such behaviour has been introduced by Knight (1921) . He proposed the distinction between those situations where individual's preferences can be described by a probabilistic model (risk) and where such models do not exist (uncertainty). The reason for inability to use probabilistic models under uncertainty is the lack of information about future outcomes. The psychological nature of perceiving uncertainty generated by the incompleteness of information turns out to be much more richer than it could be explained by a probability distribution. Mukerji and Shin (2002) formalize the link between Bayesian games with incomplete information and games under uncertainty.
The level of uncertainty would naturally seem to increase when the information structure becomes more complex. Generally in a game with one opponent a player will face less uncertainty than in the game with ten participants. As the number of players grows, it becomes crucial to be able to model uncertainty correctly. In this paper we focus on games with a large number of players who play under informational uncertainty. In such games players do not consider their opponents individually but rather look at their future actions in aggregate. Mas-Colell (1986) proposed an approach where players' beliefs about the aggregate structure of participants is modelled by a probability distribution and this distribution is a common knowledge. This assumption is very often unrealistic as in such big games players do not have precise information about the other participants. It is unlikely that all players in such a situation would be able to correctly estimate the probability and agree on this distribution. If individuals do not behave in accordance with the standard theory in simple situations, as in Ellsberg's paradox, we cannot expect them to do so in more complex situations. This is the place where many different psychological biases enter the decision process which lead to paradoxical outcomes observed in real life games and experiments.
A number of authors have introduced alternative models describing individuals' beliefs about future outcomes in the face of uncertainty by a non-additive measure (also called capacity or fuzzy measure). 1 Within these frameworks a representative agent maximizes his preference functional, defined as a Choquet integral over a utility function of future payoffs.
Many empirical investigations provide strong evidence that individuals are not uncertainty neutral in real life and react to uncertainty differently than they do to risk. In the majority of cases people are uncertainty-averse (Ellsberg 1961; Camerer and Ho 1994; Tversky and Fox 1995) ; however in some situations they tend to be uncertaintyloving as well (Curley and Yates 1989; Hogarth and Einhorn 1990) . The strength of the Choquet expected utility approach is that it makes it possible to model these different psychological attitudes to uncertainty. In fact, players can be optimistic, pessimistic
